

# Paris Agreement Monitor

Bulletin #38 (English #18) - December/2025

## Introduction

*This is the Monthly Bulletin of the Paris Agreement Monitor, which tracks the key developments in the Paris Agreement negotiation process, including meetings, workshops, official statements, submission deadlines, and document publications. The reported developments are those that occurred up until the last day of the reference month.*

*The Bulletin presents **retrospective updates** related to the previous month, and **future updates** concerning the current month, based on the publication of documents and event schedules available on the official agendas of the UNFCCC website. It also includes open deadlines and document submissions by the Parties and UNFCCC bodies.*

*The developments are categorized according to the main thematic pillars of the Paris Agreement negotiations: Mitigation, Adaptation, Loss and Damage, Carbon Markets and Article 6 Cooperation Instruments, Finance, Forests, Gender, Transparency, Global Stocktake, Compliance, Technical Capacity-Building, Response Measures, Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples, Action for Climate Empowerment, Research, Technology, and Just Transition. For issues concerning the entire negotiation process and the UNFCCC system, we use the General category.*

*At the end of the edition, you will find a glossary with the most frequently used terms in the document.*

*The updates are reported in a way that describes the events and their relevance in the negotiation process. For more in-depth information on the content of the discussions at each described event, you can access the links provided in the updates. The links refer to the original transcript of the mentioned documents, meeting agendas and minutes, submitted documents, event recordings, referred technical reports, and official event web pages. All disclosed information is official and obtained through the UNFCCC website.*

*In this monthly bulletin, there is no critical analysis from the LACLIMA Paris Agreement Observatory team on the updates, but technical opinions may be issued on specific matters*

*in other adjacent publications. If you are interested in learning more about our technical opinions, please contact us at [info@laclima.org](mailto:info@laclima.org).*

*To understand each thematic pillar of the negotiations and the issues being addressed, we recommend reading this Bulletin together with the publication "[Outcomes of COP 29](#)".*

*Happy reading!*

*Paris Agreement Observatory Team*

LACLIMA

---

## **This edition:**

We have a special edition!

Our traditional COP Summary presents a comprehensive overview of the COP 30 negotiations and their main results. This conference aimed to be the COP of implementation, inaugurating a new phase after the completion of all pending regulations of the Paris Agreement in previous cycles.

The Brazilian Presidency innovated by creating a specific negotiation space to address sensitive issues that had been systematically avoided — among them, global roadmaps to address deforestation and to promote the transition away from fossil fuels, essential elements to keep the 1.5°C limit within reach.

Although these roadmaps are not included in the formal decisions, they will be developed as political initiatives of the COP 30 Presidency throughout the next year.

COP 30 also registered significant progress in just transition and approved the long-awaited Belém Indicators for the Global Adaptation Target, a milestone expected since the creation of the GGA.

The COP in Brazil, like all others, could have gone further. Even so, it left relevant political directions and structured debates that will be decisive in future conferences, consolidating Belém as a turning point in the agenda for the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

Check it out below!

## **Summary of negotiations:**

### **Mutirão Decision**

The process of crafting the Mutirão decision began with the Brazilian Presidency launching a series of informal consultations on four central pillars: responding to the synthesis reports of

the NDCs and BTRs, operationalizing Article 9.1, addressing unilateral trade measures (UTMs), and outlining pathways to accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement. AOSIS, LDCs, the EU, the EIG, and others pushed for a “response plan” to the NDCs and the 1.5°C gap, while the LMDCs, the Arab Group, and the AGN argued that the real bottleneck is finance and advocated for a robust action plan or work program for Article 9.1, including burden-sharing arrangements. At the same time, developing countries demanded a concrete outcome on UTMs, while the EU and its allies rejected the creation of a permanent agenda item, fearing interference in domestic policies. Throughout the first week, the atmosphere was one of strong polarization but also of efforts to build trust, with the Presidency proposing political safeguards (preserving the architecture of the Paris Agreement, avoiding “finger pointing,” and respecting the nationally determined nature of NDCs) and encouraging written submissions to turn frustrations into proposals.

In the second week, based on a summary of the consultations and successive versions of the text, negotiations shifted into intensive mode: heads of delegation were asked to clarify their priorities for the “Belém Package” and respond to an initial draft of the “Mutirão Decision: uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change.” Divergences persisted regarding ambition (especially around 1.5°C), the design of a mechanism dedicated to Article 9.1, and how to address unilateral trade measures. However, points of convergence also emerged: the need to accelerate implementation, strengthen international cooperation, politically respond to the NDC ambition gap, and send a clear signal of increased finance for adaptation, including within the context of the new collective quantified goal (NCQG). The Presidency engaged in shuttle diplomacy and small “huddles” on adaptation finance, NDC response, and trade to refine the text, narrowing options and seeking a balance between developing countries’ justice-based demands and developed countries’ concerns about sovereignty and flexibility.

The final Mutirão decision structured these efforts around three main pillars. First, it launched the Global Implementation Accelerator, a cooperative, facilitative, and voluntary initiative under the guidance of the CMA7 and CMA8 presidencies, aimed at accelerating the implementation of the Paris Agreement across all actors, keeping 1.5°C within reach, and

supporting the delivery of NDCs and national adaptation plans. The text tasks the presidencies with organizing open and inclusive sessions alongside the subsidiary bodies (SB 64 and SB 65), promoting a high-level event in 2026, and presenting a progress report at CMA8—creating a dedicated political space to transform diagnostics, such as the NDC and BTR synthesis reports, into concrete actions.

Second, the decision establishes the “Belém Mission for 1.5°C,” guided by the CMA6, CMA7, and CMA8 presidencies, with the objective of advancing ambition and implementation of NDCs and adaptation plans, linking international cooperation with investments in mitigation and adaptation. The Mission functions as a political umbrella to organize specific initiatives, commitments, and collaborations, and is expected to deliver a final report at CMA8, providing a political roadmap for the critical decade leading up to 2035. Third, the text addresses trade and finance tensions by reaffirming the commitment to an open and non-discriminatory international economic system—recalling that climate measures, including unilateral ones, must not become disguised trade restrictions—and by mandating a cycle of formal dialogues within the subsidiary bodies (SB 64, 66, and 68), with the participation of ITC, UNCTAD, and the WTO on trade and climate, culminating in a high-level event in 2028.

Finally, the Mutirão decision establishes a two-year work program on climate finance, covering Article 9.1 within the broader context of Article 9. The program will be led by two co-chairs (one from a developed country and one from a developing country) appointed at CMA7. This program was designed as a partial response to developing countries’ demands for a dedicated space to address methodologies, predictability, burden sharing, and the quality of finance—while stopping short of fully embracing proposals for a more institutionalized approach to Article 9.1. Thus, the Mutirão decision consolidates a political commitment to accelerated implementation, international economic cooperation, and a structured debate on finance and trade, even though it leaves unresolved key disputes regarding resource volume, differentiated obligations, and the future treatment of unilateral trade measures.

After the adoption of the Mutirão decision, COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago made an additional statement acknowledging that critical discussions remained unresolved in the formal text and announcing that Brazil would lead, for the remainder of its Presidency, the development of two global roadmaps: one to halt and reverse deforestation and another to promote the phase-out of fossil fuels in a “just, orderly, and equitable” manner. He emphasized that these roadmaps represent important political outcomes of Belém, even if not included in the adopted decision. Both will be science-based and developed inclusively through high-level dialogues with international organizations, producer and consumer countries, the productive sector, workers, academia, and civil society. Brazil will also organize a high-level event in 2026 and report progress to CMA8, leveraging the momentum of the first international conference on the fossil fuel phase-out, scheduled for April 2026 in Colombia.

Link: <https://unfccc.int/documents/654389>

### **Global Goal on Adaptation – GGA**

The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), referenced in the Paris Agreement without an operational definition, began to take shape following COP 26 with the creation of the GlaSS program, tasked with structuring the goal and proposing metrics to assess its achievement. This process advanced through COP 28, which adopted the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience (UAE FGCR), establishing seven thematic targets and four dimensional targets to guide global progress on adaptation. The main point of controversy was the inclusion of financial targets and the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in a context where a significant finance gap persists. In parallel, the UAE FGCR launched the UAE–Belém Program to develop global indicators — a technically complex task that soon became the center of negotiations.

At COP 29 and during the SB 62 intersessional meeting, the focus was on consolidating a list of up to 100 quantitative and qualitative indicators that reflect different contexts, incorporate means of implementation, and include cross-cutting dimensions such as youth,

gender, human rights, and traditional knowledge. Parties also agreed to create the Baku Adaptation Route (BAR) to operationalize Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement and the elements of the UAE FGCR. However, issues such as transformational adaptation and the future of the BAR saw little progress and were left for decision at COP 30. Meanwhile, other adaptation tracks — such as the Nairobi Work Programme — recorded modest progress, although outstanding issues regarding means of implementation and governance were deferred to Belém and SB 70.

Negotiations on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) at COP 30 were marked by intense dispute over adoption of the indicator list, a central element for operationalizing the Global Climate Resilience Framework. While most Parties — including the EU, LDCs, SUR, the United Kingdom, and several Latin American countries — pushed for immediate adoption of the indicators in Belém, the African Group (AGN) advocated for an additional two-year work program, which would delay the decision until COP 32.

Despite limited convergence around reducing the number of indicators and ensuring a clear post-Belém mandate, positions remained far apart through the end of the first week. In parallel, a strong coalition of developing countries coalesced around a call for COP 30 to triple adaptation finance — to at least USD 120 billion by 2030 — with proposals also linking the adaptation goal to 50–75% of the NCQG. The Presidency insisted on delivering an “adaptation COP,” but the process suffered from political tensions and technical difficulties, including disagreements over the future of the Baku Adaptation Route and concerns over the methodological feasibility of the revised text, which reduced the indicators from 100 to 59.

The decision adopted at CMA.7 recognizes the centrality of adaptation within the Paris Agreement, reaffirms fundamental political principles — such as equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and respect for national circumstances — and expresses strong appreciation for the technical work conducted under the UAE–Belém Program. Politically, it highlights the role of children, youth, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and other groups in building resilience, and reiterates the need for adequate, predictable, and accessible financing for developing countries. At the decision-making level, CMA.7 formally

concludes the UAE–Belém Program, adopts the Belém Adaptation Indicators, establishes clear guidance on their voluntary, non-prescriptive, and non-punitive nature, and specifies that they do not create additional obligations nor serve as a basis for financial conditionalities. It also creates the Belém–Addis Vision, a two-year technical-political process to improve methodologies and metadata for the indicators, and structures the first phase of the Baku Adaptation Route (2026–2028), focusing on initial implementation and cooperation between subsidiary bodies. The decision anchors the use of indicators in reporting instruments (BTRs, adaptation communications, NAPs, NDCs), requests technical and financial support from mechanisms such as the GEF, GCF, and Adaptation Fund, defines mandates for new technical work, and provides that the indicators will be reviewed after the second Global Stocktake, in 2029, consolidating adaptation as a central pillar of the climate regime on the road to COP 32.

During the final plenary, AILAC and other Parties raised objections to the decision text after the gavel had already come down (the act that formalizes adoption of the text). They stated that they had requested the floor before adoption and would have liked to be heard before the text was finalized.

At that point, the Secretariat clarified that once a decision has been formally adopted, it becomes valid and cannot be reopened. In response, the COP President stated that the issue will return to negotiations at the Bonn Conference in June 2026.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025\\_L25E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L25E.pdf)

## **Just Transition**

The decision on the Just Transition Work Programme (United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme – UAE JTWP) at CMA.7 consolidated, for the first time, a more robust political and operational framework for the topic under the Paris Agreement. After the program’s creation in Sharm El-Sheikh, the process advanced through four technical dialogues organized by the Subsidiary Bodies — held in Germany, Egypt, Panama, and

Ethiopia — which helped systematize experiences, good practices, and challenges related to pathways for just transitions across multiple sectors and national contexts. The decision reaffirms that just transition is relevant for mitigation, adaptation, and responses to loss and damage; anchors the work in the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, human rights, the rights of Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities, gender equality, decent work, and broad social participation; and highlights the importance of incorporating just transition into NDCs, NAPs, and long-term development strategies aligned with the first Global Stocktake.

Arriving in Belém for COP 30, the JTWP negotiating text that came from SB 62 in the form of informal notes carried four particularly sensitive themes. Two had been explicitly mandated by the SBs' co-chairs: (i) Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, concerning the obligation of developed countries to lead in financing for developing countries; and (ii) unilateral trade measures, which have the potential to negatively impact developing economies. Two additional issues emerged from the discussions in Bonn: (iii) the transition away from fossil fuels; and (iv) institutional arrangements, including the possible creation of a network or mechanism to coordinate just transition efforts. Among these, institutional arrangements were the most strategic and forward-looking agenda item for civil society: the Climate Action Network (CAN) mobilized a strong campaign in favor of creating the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), advocating for a global “umbrella” to connect initiatives, support, and knowledge on just transition at different scales.

Negotiations in Belém were marked by significant tensions around these four elements, particularly at the interface with finance, international trade, and the fossil fuels agenda. As discussions advanced on the “mutirão” — the broader, cross-cutting decision intended to organize the full set of COP 30 outcomes — debates on the responsibilities of developed countries regarding climate finance (Article 9.1), unilateral trade measures, and language on transitioning away from fossil fuels were shifted to the mutirão decision, removing them from the dedicated just transition decision. While this did not eliminate controversy around the substance, it created room for the JTWP to focus on designing a robust institutional arrangement capable of sustaining the topic over the medium term.

The decision adopted at CMA.7 consolidates this commitment by recognizing the intrinsic link between efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C and the construction of just transition pathways; reaffirming core political principles — such as equity, CBDR-RC, human rights, and the participation of workers, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, youth, women, and vulnerable groups — and emphasizing the need for means of implementation that are adequate, predictable, and that do not exacerbate indebtedness in developing countries. Operationally, the decision: (i) systematizes key messages from the JTWP dialogues on decent work, social protection, energy transition, education, and workforce training; (ii) requests that the Secretariat map relevant instruments, initiatives, and processes under the UNFCCC and across the UN system; and (iii) invites constituted bodies to integrate just transition elements into their work plans and reports.

The most innovative point is the creation of a just transition mechanism, intended to strengthen international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity building, and knowledge exchange to support equitable and inclusive just transitions, in coordination with existing mechanisms and programs. The decision mandates the Subsidiary Bodies, at SB 64 (June 2026 in Bonn), to prepare a draft decision on the operationalization process for this mechanism to be considered at CMA.8, in the same negotiation package that will assess the renewal of the JTWP as a whole. In line with the spirit of the mutirão, the decision invites Parties and observers to submit, by 15 March 2026, their views on the mechanism's design and on the review of the program's effectiveness and continuity. This arrangement concludes COP 30 with a clear political signal: although structural issues concerning finance, trade, and fossil fuels were shifted to the mutirão decision, just transition gained its own institutional space, with a medium-term horizon and a technical and political track capable of giving substance to the program.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7\\_5\\_UAE%20JTWP\\_auv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7_5_UAE%20JTWP_auv.pdf)

**Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement (GST)**

At COP 30, three agenda items were established for discussion on the GST. The first aimed to analyze the GST presented in 2023 through the “United Arab Emirates Dialogue,” focused on exploring how the results of GST-1 could guide the preparation of the next NDCs (a “look back”). An informal note prepared at SB 62 was intended to serve as the basis for the discussions at COP 30, and Parties were expected to advance in clearly defining the scope, mandate, and operational modalities of the dialogue in order to decide how the diagnostics and recommendations from GST-1 could contribute to the development of GST-2 and to progress in implementing the Paris Agreement.

The second agenda item concerned the next GST to be presented in 2028, discussing its logistical and procedural elements (a “look forward”). The expectation was that, considering the lessons learned from the first cycle—including the relationship with IPCC reports, data sources, and the integration of the mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage dimensions—CMA 7 would define the guidelines for GST-2. Finally, the third agenda item, more procedural in nature, concerned the approval of the reports on the dialogues held in 2024 and 2025, pursuant to paragraph 187 of Decision 1/CMA.5.

Regarding the UAE Dialogue, negotiations were marked by strong divergences over its scope and timeline. Blocs such as AILAC, AOSIS, LDCs, EIG, the EU, and countries such as Norway, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Japan argued that the dialogue should adopt a broad approach that covers all results of GST-1, identifies gaps, and accelerates implementation opportunities, positioning the Dialogue as a crucial link (“a bridge”) between GST-1 and GST-2. They therefore argued that GST-1 should serve as an instrument for calibrating the next cycle of NDCs. In contrast, the LMDC and the Arab Group defended a more limited scope, arguing that the Dialogue and GST-1 should have only an informational character and could not be prescriptive in terms of policies to be adopted by Parties. Accordingly, they emphasized the need to focus on means of implementation—especially finance—and to avoid duplicating the GST mandate or creating a new negotiation space to analyze “collective progress,” which led some countries to describe the Dialogue as becoming a “mini GST.”

Regarding the Dialogue's timeframe, countries such as India and China and the LMDC group expressed strong concern about an "ad infinitum process" that would become a parallel negotiation process to GST-2, proposing that the Dialogue be concluded earlier to avoid overlapping work. On the other hand, the EIG, the UK and AOSIS supported the continuation of the Dialogue until 2028.

With respect to the procedural and logistical elements of GST-2, there were divergences on three main points. First, there was debate over the "best available science" as a source for GST-2, with LMDC and India questioning the consideration of the IPCC as the primary scientific source and arguing for the inclusion of other knowledge sources, especially from developing countries. Blocs such as AILAC, LDCs and the EU strongly maintained that the IPCC should be recognized as the primary and central source of "best available science," though they were flexible with language acknowledging other possible sources of knowledge.

Another point of intense discussion was the definition of the timeline for the next phases of the GST, with proposals for technical dialogues between 2026 and 2027, but with concerns over overlap between the technical and political phases, as well as with the UAE Dialogue. Lastly, the issue of Loss and Damage was also discussed, with blocs such as LDCs and AILAC and countries such as Indonesia, the Maldives and Grenada arguing that the topic should be considered as an autonomous thematic area within GST-2.

In this context, regarding the United Arab Emirates Dialogue, a decision was adopted that makes explicit that it will be facilitative and not prescriptive, aimed at sharing opportunities, challenges, barriers and needs in implementing the GST outcomes. It was further decided that the Dialogue will be held at the first meeting of the SBs in Bonn in 2026 and 2027, after which it will be concluded; additionally, a high-level ministerial roundtable will be organized at CMA 9. For each dialogue, a factual and non-prescriptive report will be prepared, which will serve as input for GST-2.

As for GST-2, flexible language was adopted regarding scientific information sources, referring to paragraphs 35–37 of Decision 19/CMA.1, which indicate the information sources for the GST, including the latest IPCC reports. The decision recognizes the critical importance of the IPCC but encourages the scientific community to provide contributions of the best available science, as well as comprehensive and representative inputs from developing countries, along with reports from regional groups and institutions. Concerning the topic of loss and damage, the decision merely encourages the co-facilitators of the technical dialogue to strengthen the consideration of efforts to prevent, minimize and address loss and damage.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025\\_L06\\_adv\\_0.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L06_adv_0.pdf)

### **Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP)**

The mandate of the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP) is defined in Decision 4/CMA.4, which establishes its non-prescriptive, non-punitive, and sovereignty-respecting nature, reaffirming that no new targets or obligations may be created. For COP 30 in Belém, Parties were expected to advance on three fronts: deciding the future of the programme after 2026; understanding the outcomes of the Global Dialogues; and discussing Brazil's proposal for a digital mitigation platform, including its governance, integration with the Article 6.8 NMA platform, and its potential role in connecting projects with financiers.

The negotiations were marked by polarization between developed countries—who advocated for greater operationalization, integration with the GST, and recognition of the dialogues on forests and waste—and developing countries, especially the Arab Group, LMDC, and parts of the AGN, who insisted on the autonomy of the mandate, resisted automatic integration with the GST, and expressed caution regarding new structures. The creation of a digital platform became the main point of contention, dividing Parties between those who sought expanded functionalities, those willing to discuss the matter only after technical studies, and those who rejected any expansion due to risks of overlap with Article

6.8 and overburdening bodies such as the TEC and CTCN. Debates over the 2025 dialogue outcomes also divided Parties: developed countries and AILAC supported detailed text on forests and waste, while LMDC, the Arab Group, and Russia preferred merely “taking note” of the outcomes. Regarding continuity of the programme, a majority formed in favor of immediately initiating a process of consultations and syntheses, although LMDC, India, and Russia insisted on strictly maintaining the original mandate and postponing all decisions to 2026. After extensive informal consultations, a more concise and less prescriptive text acceptable as a basis for the second week was produced and included in the package of texts prepared by the presidency.

The final text reinforces the voluntary, non-prescriptive, and sovereignty-based nature of the MWP, maintaining strict alignment with the original mandate. For the outcomes of the dialogues on forests and waste, consensus language was chosen, recognizing only the critical role of these sectors, the importance of Indigenous Peoples and recognition of their lands, sustainable management, co-benefits, and international cooperation, without prescriptive detail. Regarding the digital platform, the outcome was moderate: Parties are encouraged to register projects on the NMA Platform, and the secretariat is tasked with preparing a technical study on possible new functionalities, to be considered by the SBSTA in 2026, without immediately creating new structures. On continuity, it was decided to request submissions from Parties and observers by 15 April 2026 on opportunities, challenges, and suggestions for the future of the MWP; these inputs will be analyzed at SB 64 in June 2026, and the final decision on whether to continue or redesign the programme will be taken only at CMA 8 in 2026.

At the final plenary, Colombia stated that it did not agree with the adopted text, arguing that it lacked ambition and defending that the expression “transitioning away from fossil fuels” be incorporated into the final language. However, these observations were made only after the text had been formally adopted by the plenary. Accordingly, the secretariat clarified that, at that procedural stage, the document had already been approved and could not be reopened for amendments. Thus, despite the concerns recorded by both countries, the text was officially adopted.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025\\_L08\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L08_adv.pdf)

## **Article 6 and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)**

### Article 6.2 – The ITMO Market

Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement establishes the framework for voluntary cooperation between countries through the international transfer of mitigation outcomes (ITMOs). At COP 30, Parties advanced on key elements to strengthen the integrity and operationalization of this market, focusing particularly on lessons learned from the technical review processes of information submitted by participating countries and on the need for greater predictability in registry and monitoring infrastructure.

The second Ambition Dialogue brought together Parties and observers to highlight recurring challenges in domestic implementation and pathways to increase collective ambition. Positions diverged: the AGN called for the creation of guiding principles for engagement under Article 6.2; Australia announced that it does not intend to use ITMOs at this stage, prioritizing domestic decarbonization; and the European Union, aligned with its updated NDC, will consider using ITMOs only from 2035 onward, with strong scrutiny of potential partners. AOSIS emphasized the role of voluntary ITMO cancellation to enhance Overall Mitigation in Global Emissions (OMGE), while several constituency groups — ENGO, TUNGO, YOUNGO and IPO — criticized the use of ITMOs for offsetting at the expense of enhancing ambition in host countries. Among the developments presented, notable examples include the issuance of 1,009 tCO<sub>2</sub>eq in ITMOs under the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) between Japan and Thailand, and the new Japan–India partnership.

As a result of negotiations, the decision on Article 6.2 requested its Technical Review Group to more clearly explain inconsistencies identified in country reports and present recommendations to correct them. It also asks the Secretariat to organize interactive informal dialogues during COP 31 to help identify recurrent patterns and structural needs in reporting. The goal is to improve transparency, strengthen technical capacity, and support the

production of more robust reports, including on contributions to adaptation and voluntary ITMO cancellation. Parties also expressed concern over delays in implementing registry and monitoring infrastructure and urged the Secretariat to accelerate the process.

The financial agenda also gained prominence. Confronted with an US\$8 million deficit and an estimated US\$14 million cost to operationalize Article 6.2 through 2027, Parties requested the SBI to recommend, at its 64th Session (June 2026), a long-term resource allocation plan for infrastructure, experts, and capacity building. Discussions also addressed the future of the International Transaction Log (ITL), the electronic system for CDM transactions, which will be decommissioned once the Mechanism shuts down. After debates on how to redistribute remaining ITL funds — including proposals to redirect them to adaptation and response measures — it was decided that the US\$2 million available will be allocated by 2027, with US\$1.5 million directed to Article 6 support activities (including registry infrastructure) and US\$0.5 million to supplemental activities linked to environmental and social impacts not directly covered by Article 6.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7\\_15a\\_Art6.2\\_AUV.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7_15a_Art6.2_AUV.pdf)

#### **Article 6.4 – The PACM**

Article 6.4 establishes the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), whose operationalization is carried out by the Supervisory Body (SBM). At COP 30, the CMA's mandate focused on reviewing the work of the SBM and its Methodology Expert Panel (MEP), in light of the annual report submitted to the Conference. Negotiations were marked by extensive debate on the need to increase the institutional capacity of the Body, particularly due to the shortage of experts, which led to discussion of a possible extension of terms for members and suspension of the minimum interval rule between consecutive terms. To avoid reopening decisions without a specific mandate, Parties agreed to revisit the issue only in 2028, when a formal authorization will allow review of these rules.

Parties and observers expressed significant concerns about the process of developing rules, standards, and methodologies by the SBM and MEP. Criticisms focused on the limited rationale provided for decisions and the short timeframe for stakeholder submissions. In response, the COP 30 decision reinforced the requirement for high standards of transparency, without compromising timely operationalization of the mechanism. The Secretariat was tasked with broadening and publicizing engagement opportunities to ensure the participation of a more diverse set of actors — particularly Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities — and to facilitate more inclusive consultations.

A key point of expectation was the possible review of rules adopted in 2025, especially concerning mitigation of non-permanence risks in forestry projects. Despite pressure, the COP preserved the decision-making autonomy of the SBM and reaffirmed that future rules must ensure high environmental integrity and be based on the best available science. The deadline for host countries to submit approval for transitioning CDM activities to the PACM was extended to June 30, 2026, considering the volume of pending requests.

Financing of the PACM was among the most sensitive issues and was directly tied to the closure of CDM operations. With the Mechanism scheduled to fully shut down between June and December 2026 — including issuance of CERs, transfers to Article 6.4, cancellations, methodological revisions, and DOE accreditation — it became possible to reallocate remaining resources. After intense negotiations, Parties agreed to transfer US\$26.8 million from the CDM trust fund to the Article 6.4 fund, ensuring the PACM's operational sustainability. Up to US\$5 million of this total will support capacity-building initiatives. In addition, once the PACM becomes self-financing, it will make annual contributions to the Adaptation Fund until reaching US\$56.8 million, with transfers beginning by 2035.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7\\_15b\\_A6.4\\_auv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7_15b_A6.4_auv.pdf)

## **Article 6.8 – Instrument for Non-Market Approaches (NMAs)**

Discussions related to Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement, which addresses non-market approaches (NMAs), were guided by the mandated event organized by the SBSTA within the 8th meeting of the Glasgow Committee on Non-Market Approaches, along with negotiations to define next year's work program and improvements to the NMA platform. In the first week, a workshop was held to facilitate exchange of information on NMAs. Parties such as Japan, Malaysia, Uganda, and the African Development Bank (AfDB), as well as non-Parties including CGIAR, LACLIMA, the NDC Partnership, and the Bolivian Platform on Climate Change (PBFCC), shared insights, lessons learned, challenges, and proposals related to the implementation and enhancement of NMAs. Under the SBSTA agenda, the Secretariat updated the Platform's information, highlighting the registration of a new NMA submitted by Chile and Canada, focused on organic waste recycling to reduce methane, and noting that there are currently 105 national focal points and 31 support providers registered.

Later in the week, a consultation was held to define the topic for the spin-off group tasked with preparing inputs for the draft text to be submitted to the CMA. Discussions — guided by AILAC, AOSIS, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, and LMDC — explored ways to encourage new NMAs, initiatives related to the ocean ecosystem, and the potential for “single NMAs”, understood as approaches implemented by a single Party without bilateral cooperation. Recommendations carried into the second week included guidance on using the Platform and discussion forum — such as new filters and encouraging engagement, especially within the “opportunities for collaboration” tab. Negotiations also continued on structuring the 2026 work program, including scheduling, topics for upcoming workshops, and expected inputs for program review, such as adjustments to the Platform allowing countries to submit information independently through their focal points, increasing visibility of their needs for financial, technological, and capacity-building support.

In the second week, negotiations within the CMA focused on defining the work program agenda. One of the most contentious issues was the LMDC proposal to include references to the impact of restrictive unilateral trade measures related to climate, a topic that failed to reach consensus and was opposed by AILAC, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. The final text removed this reference and determined that Parties and observers shall submit,

by March 31, suggestions for discussion topics for the 9th and 10th meetings of the Glasgow Committee. Finally, progress was made in preparing the program review, which will assess the effectiveness of activities, focal point participation, and contributions of NMAs to achieving NDCs, conditioned on budget availability for 2026.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7\\_15c\\_A6.8\\_auv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7_15c_A6.8_auv.pdf)

### **Synergies among the Rio Conventions**

Discussions on synergies among the three Rio Conventions — the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) — advanced at COP 30 within the agenda on cooperation among international organizations. Although this topic is already more mature under the CBD, which has a specific decision on integration and coordination, the expectation for this COP was to formalize its incorporation into the UNFCCC process as well. The initiative received broad support from several Parties and strong engagement from stakeholders, who view the issue as strategic for strengthening integrated approaches to climate, biodiversity, and desertification. Countries such as Brazil and Colombia played particularly active roles in promoting progress on this agenda.

Despite the majority support, some Parties — particularly Saudi Arabia — expressed resistance, proposing to postpone the discussion to SB 64, in Bonn. Faced with the risk of stagnation, the COP 30 Presidency conducted intensive informal consultations to keep the issue alive and find a minimal path toward convergence. These efforts resulted in consensus around draft conclusions presented by the COP President, ensuring that the agenda remained open and evolving.

The agreed text recalls that SBSTA, at its 62nd Session, had already recognized the need to expand cooperation with other international organizations and had decided to continue considering the topic at SBSTA 63. The conclusions also acknowledge the submissions made by Parties and observers before and during the COP, and recognize that although the Rio

Conventions have their own mandates, governance structures, and principles, cooperation among them is important and should be strengthened whenever appropriate.

The final conclusion requests that the UNFCCC Secretariat intensify its engagement in the Joint Liaison Group — the joint group of the secretariats of the UNFCCC, CBD, and UNCCD — within its institutional mandate, and invites Parties and observers to submit, by 1 May 2026, new inputs on how to enhance cooperation with international organizations and among the secretariats of the Rio Conventions. SBSTA 64 will revisit the issue based on these submissions, keeping the process active and consolidating.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2025\\_L01E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2025_L01E.pdf)

## **Transparency**

### **Reports from non-Annex I Parties to the Convention: Timeline, composition, terms of reference, and report of the Consultative Group of Experts**

The Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) is the main mechanism providing technical support to developing countries in fulfilling their transparency obligations under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Its mandate was extended until 2026 by decision 11/CP.24, and its terms of reference were revised in Glasgow by decision 14/CP.26. For COP 30, a comprehensive decision was expected on the CGE's mandate, composition, and terms of reference, including the possibility of making it a permanent group, revising the regional distribution of seats, and updating its functions to reflect the transition from the previous reporting system to the new transparency framework under the Paris Agreement.

Negotiations concerning the CGE evolved around financing, composition, and mandate, which directly shaped the final outcome. The unprecedented absence of the CGE's annual report — due to a lack of resources — dominated the initial interventions of G77+China, the Arab Group, AGN, and AOSIS. This generated pressure to institutionalize the group and prevent budget limitations from continuing to hinder its work. In parallel, the debate on

composition emerged, with developing countries insisting on maintaining regional balance and safeguarding seats for LDCs and SIDS. Discussions on the CGE's role in supporting BTRs helped reinforce its centrality within the ETF, influencing the update of its terms of reference and elements of ongoing work.

The final outcome was politically significant, as the CGE is now granted a permanent mandate, eliminating recurring uncertainty over its continuity and strengthening predictability for developing countries that rely on its technical support. The new composition fixes the group at 27 members, including: 2 from Annex I countries, 6 from non-Annex I, 1 additional non-Annex I member from Eastern Europe, 3 representatives from each regional group (Africa, Asia-Pacific, GRULAC, and WEOG), 1 representative of LDCs, 1 of SIDS, 1 from Eastern Europe, and 3 from international organizations. Regarding future reviews, it was agreed that the next one will take place at SBI 78, preparing material for COP 38 — a regular eight-year cycle. Concerning financing, language on “adequate resources” disappeared, replaced by language tied to budget availability, frustrating the demands of developing countries. CMA 7 will also “take note” of the COP decision and confirm that the CGE will likewise serve the Paris Agreement, consolidating its dual role within the ETF.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop30\\_5\\_CGE\\_ToR\\_auv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop30_5_CGE_ToR_auv.pdf)

#### **Item 4(b) – Provision of financial and technical support**

Item 4(b) is directly linked to Article 4.1(b) of the Convention, which requires all Parties to formulate, implement, and update national (and, when appropriate, regional) mitigation and adaptation programs, taking into account common but differentiated responsibilities and national circumstances. For non-Annex I countries to meet these obligations, financial and technical support is considered a fundamental pillar. For COP 30, expectations included advancing facilitated access to GEF funding, strengthening technical support for reporting activities, and maintaining simplified mechanisms that reduce administrative burdens on developing countries.

Among all transparency-related texts, negotiations on item 4(b) advanced the fastest toward consensus, reaching the second week with virtually no political divergences. The Bonn informal note served as a stable basis, and most paragraphs were approved immediately. The few sensitive issues centered on the paragraph encouraging the joint submission of NCs and BTRs: AILAC, India, and the Arab Group initially requested its removal, while the United Kingdom and Australia supported maintaining it. Remaining debates on paragraphs 8 and 15 were resolved through final concessions between Saudi Arabia and Australia. As a result, the text emerged from informal consultations fully clean.

The final text emphasizes the importance of maintaining and expanding financial and technical support provided through bilateral, multilateral, and other channels, recognizing that such support is essential for non-Annex I countries to meet the mitigation and adaptation requirements under the Convention and the transparency framework. The decision explicitly values GEF efforts to simplify its processes and allow the joint submission of National Communications and BTRs, reducing the institutional burden on developing countries. The SBI also strongly encourages countries that have already received funding but have not yet submitted their BURs to do so as soon as possible, reinforcing the principle of efficient resource use. It also welcomes the more than 30% increase in GEF resources designated for capacity-building and transparency in the most recent cycle, underscoring the need to maintain such levels. Finally, it directs the GEF to maintain periodic reviews of the support it provides and instructs the UNFCCC Secretariat to strengthen its technical assistance, ensuring that countries can effectively meet their reporting and implementation obligations.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbi2025\\_L13r01E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbi2025_L13r01E.pdf)

### **Provision of financial and technical support for developing countries for reporting and capacity-building**

Article 13 of the Paris Agreement establishes the enhanced transparency framework (ETF) for action and support, with flexibility for developing countries, a non-intrusive nature, and a

focus on building mutual trust. It requires countries to submit greenhouse gas inventories, information tracking progress toward their NDCs, data on impacts and adaptation, and comprehensive information on support provided, received, and needed. The Article also mandates technical expert reviews (TERs), multilateral consultations of progress, and ongoing support for capacity-building. In the context of COP 30, SBI Item 5 was expected to consolidate implementation guidelines for the ETF, define the 2026–2028 activity cycle, and reaffirm the commitment to adequate and predictable support for developing countries. It was also expected to update the status of BTR submissions and advance guidance on the technical support provided by the secretariat and financial institutions.

Negotiations on the item were marked by strong political and linguistic tension, especially between the United Kingdom and the Arab Group, which diverged over references to support, financing, and governance. As a result, there was not enough convergence to produce a draft decision during the first week. Australia proposed issuing only an informal note with text still in brackets for later negotiation, while the African Group insisted that the document should reflect that “substantial progress” had been made and that Parties were close to a draft text. With disagreements persisting, the item was escalated to the high-level segment (“the package”), where ministers sought political compromises to unlock the text. It was only on Thursday of the second week that a finalized text emerged, the result of political mediation and the removal of the most controversial elements — mainly those related to funding gaps and explicit criticism of the pace of support provided by developed countries.

The final decision is significantly more concise than previous versions. The text updates operational ETF data, including the number of BTRs submitted (“119 BTRs as of 19 November 2025”), ensuring accuracy without prescriptive language. Controversial elements from earlier drafts were entirely removed, particularly paragraphs acknowledging funding gaps in GEF-7, pointing to underutilization of resources in GEF-8, or explicitly asking developed countries to strengthen their provision of support. Instead, only a general formulation was retained, reaffirming the importance of adequate support without assigning additional obligations.

The main technical advancement lies in the restructuring of future ETF activities. The three options originally proposed for the 2026–2028 cycles were consolidated into a single, more objective and functional list, clearly defining an annual cycle consisting of: a survey, preparation of the survey report, calls for submissions, synthesis of submissions, “world café” workshops, regional workshops, and the production of summaries of these meetings. This consolidation reduces disputes and creates predictability for countries and for the secretariat.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/ETF\\_cma7\\_1.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/ETF_cma7_1.pdf)

## **Finance**

### **Article 2.1(c) in complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement**

During the three years of the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) in complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, Parties had the opportunity to exchange experiences, opportunities, and challenges regarding what it truly means to “make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (Article 2.1(c)). Negotiations mandated for CMA7 were expected to consider the work carried out and to decide on the future of this agenda.

Parties shared that the Dialogues were useful in building a common understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c), but that more work was still needed. Developed countries — such as the EU, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada — emphasized the importance of grounding future work in the report presented by the Co-Facilitators, while G77 + China, LMDCs, the Arab Group, and the African Group stressed that future work must first consider certain safeguards. An entire session was dedicated to this issue, with Parties underscoring the importance of a facilitative, non-prescriptive approach based on the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities; viewing Article 2.1(c) as complementary to Article 9 (not a substitute); preventing greenwashing and maladaptation; ensuring meaningful participation of affected communities; addressing barriers to finance access; and recognizing the special circumstances of LDCs and SIDS.

Regarding the future of the agenda, Parties raised options such as non-prescriptive exchanges on domestic policies, high-level guidance and global coordination linked to the GST cycle, High-Level Dialogues, and a Climate Finance Flows Platform. The final text states that discussions will now take place under the Veredas Dialogue, which will convene the Xingu Finance Conversations — annual high-level roundtables to facilitate cooperative exchanges between Parties and non-Party stakeholders on implementing Article 2.1(c) in complementarity with Article 9. Notably, Parties also agreed to important safeguard language, providing greater confidence and security for future commitments; and there was recognition of the UNFCCC's convening power — an initial step toward connecting climate finance negotiations under the Convention with external actors.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025\\_L11adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L11adv.pdf)

## **Article 9.5**

Negotiations focused primarily on updating the content of the Biennial Communications (BCs) on climate finance required under Article 9.5. Some Parties, including the EU, EIG, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, emphasized that the content of the BCs should not be updated. However, in light of the NCQG and the new climate finance architecture, AOSIS, ALLAC, and especially other developing countries stressed the need to update it to include both quantitative and qualitative information. Parties remained deeply divided throughout the two weeks, but the final text was concluded with an updated annex incorporating important elements, including new and additional reporting on public finance, as well as greater transparency regarding the priorities and methodologies used by developed countries.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025\\_L13E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L13E.pdf)

## **Adaptation Fund**

Adaptation finance was one of the most contentious issues at COP 30. Negotiations on the Adaptation Fund at COP 30 focused on the transition to serving exclusively the Paris Agreement, governance issues — especially the composition of the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) and terminology — and the fifth review of the Fund. Terminology is a key issue because the Adaptation Fund was established under the Kyoto Protocol, where Parties are divided into Annex I and non-Annex I, and for the transition to the Paris Agreement, this must be updated to the terminology adopted in 2015, which divides Parties into developed and developing countries. Despite broad consensus on the need for a smooth transition that would allow the Fund to receive revenues from Article 6.4, deep political divergences regarding governance prevented the adoption of conclusions by the Subsidiary Bodies, leading the SBI Chair to forward a preliminary text to the CMA and CMP. Throughout the second week, many developing countries (AGN, LDCs, AILAC, Arab Group) supported advancing the technical work of the transition while leaving political elements to higher-level bodies, whereas developed countries (EU, United Kingdom, Australia) insisted that these points must be resolved within the same package.

The lack of resource mobilization also marked the discussions. The Fund failed to meet its annual fundraising target of USD 300 million in both 2023 and 2024, and 2025 is heading toward a similar scenario. Although the high-level segment announced new contributions, totaling around USD 127.9 million, the amount fell far short of expectations and exacerbated concerns about the Fund's financial sustainability. Overall, negotiations advanced on the technical aspects of the transition but remained inconclusive on governance and financing issues, which now move to SB 64 in 2026, especially with regard to terminology on the composition of the Board.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025\\_L17E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L17E.pdf)

## **Technology**

The technology mandate under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement guides support for the development and transfer of climate technologies to developing countries. It is

operationalized through the Technology Mechanism, composed of the TEC (analytical and advisory function) and the CTCN (technical assistance and implementation). In 2025, this mandate took on central importance, because after the first Global Stocktake there was strong expectation that technology would become a real pillar of implementation. COP30, therefore, became a decisive moment to update functions, create new programmes, and adjust the institutional capacity of the Technology Mechanism.

In this context, the COP30 technology agenda had four items for decision: (1) the Technology Implementation Programme (TIP), designed to structure an operational mechanism for implementation; (2) the Review of the Functions of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), which would redefine its role for the next decade; (3) linkages between the technology and finance mechanisms, aimed at improving the connection between TEC/CTCN and the GCF/GEF; and (4) the Joint TEC–CTCN Report, which annually compiles recommendations and strategic coordination between the two bodies. Among these items, the highest expectations for conclusion were centred on the TIP and the CTCN review, seen as essential to respond to implementation needs identified after the Global Stocktake. The “linkages” item had low expectations due to longstanding divergences over financial guidance.

During negotiations, the issue of finance—although it did not produce a standalone decision—permeated all agendas, including the TIP and the CTCN. Groups such as G77+China, LMDC, LDC and AILAC insisted that any new programme, function or institutional revision needed to reflect the real capacity of the bodies to support developing countries in seeking and accessing finance, a condition essential for technology development and transfer to occur in practice. In the CTCN review, this debate was particularly significant: several countries pushed for the text to move beyond language limited to “facilitation” and incorporate explicit mandates for direct support to implementation, including technical assistance for preparing fundable proposals and mechanisms for connecting to financiers. Meanwhile, progress on linkages and the joint report was hindered precisely due to the lack of consensus on adequate financing for the Technology Mechanism. By the end of the second

week, it was clear that only the TIP and the CTCN would have the political maturity to be adopted.

COP30 adopted substantive decisions on these two pillars. The Belém Technology Implementation Programme (TIP) was established with objectives to support technological priorities of developing countries, strengthen national innovation systems, improve enabling environments, support NDEs, and expand preparation of fundable projects (FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/L.18). The TIP begins implementation immediately and provides for global dialogues under the SBI starting in 2027, and will be reviewed in 2034.

The CTCN review introduced structural innovations (FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/L.4), with an explicit mandate for direct support for deployment, diffusion and demonstration of technologies; strengthening of national innovation systems and endogenous technologies; expanded technical support to NDEs; institutionalization of networks and international partnerships; introduction of monitoring and evaluation; and, above all, strengthening the role of the CTCN as a bridge between projects and financing, with clear matchmaking functions (Annex I, d(vi)) and support for preparing fundable proposals (Annex I, a(vi)). The decision also extends its mandate to 2041 and launches the process for selecting a new host, to be decided at SBI 64 in 2026.

On the other hand, the “linkages” agenda and the Joint TEC–CTCN Report were not concluded and will be resumed at SBI/SBSTA 64 in June 2026.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7\\_11b\\_ctc\\_AUV.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7_11b_ctc_AUV.pdf)  
[https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7\\_11c\\_TIP\\_AUV.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma7_11c_TIP_AUV.pdf)

### **Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures**

For COP 30, there were expectations that the forum on the impacts of the implementation of response measures would decide which activities would be prioritized by the group, based on the 2026–2030 workplan adopted at COP 29. In addition, the forum was expected to

discuss the continuation of the annual global dialogues and the impacts of unilateral trade measures, as well as to receive the annual report of the Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI), in which the timeline and modalities for the activities of the 2026–2030 workplan had been decided.

When adopting the COP 30 agenda, the Presidency decided that the issue of unilateral trade measures would be addressed in dedicated consultations, effectively removing it from the response measures rooms. As a result, discussions focused mainly on procedural aspects of the response measures forum and the KCI. Regarding the report presented by the KCI, some Parties such as the United Kingdom, the European Union and Canada questioned the modalities and timelines established by the body, raising concerns about whether there were sufficient financial resources to implement them. Groups such as the G77 and China, AGN and LDCs considered these objections inappropriate, since the activities and the workplan had already been adopted in Baku (Decision 16/CP.29), and revisiting them would effectively reopen a consensus decision. The prioritization of activities for the 2026–2030 workplan was discussed in informal settings, where developing countries, including the G77 + China, AGN and Honduras, argued that the forum's priority should be to address the negative impacts of response measures, while developed countries such as the European Union, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Canada argued that the list was unbalanced and that positive impacts (co-benefits) should also be considered.

Given the impasses, several informal meetings between Parties were held, but they failed to reach consensus on the draft decision text. Parties such as the AGN, the G77 and China, and Honduras indicated they could accept flexible language, provided it remained within the forum's mandate and did not reopen the already adopted workplan. Thus, the co-chairs forwarded a report of the discussions to the COP Presidency, which became responsible for preparing a new text and building consensus through closed-door consultations.

In this context, the Presidency proposed—and the COP adopted—a decision that takes note of the annual report prepared by the KCI, including its modalities and timelines. With regard to priority activities for the 2026–2030 workplan, it was decided that, during the forum's

second annual meeting (held at COPs), the activities to be carried out in the subsequent year will be decided, ensuring that all 17 activities are covered holistically over the five-year period. Finally, it was decided that two-day annual dialogues will be held, in a hybrid format, concurrently with the intersessional meeting of the KCI, from 2026 to 2029, after which the SBs will consider whether to continue holding the dialogues.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cmp2025\\_L06E\\_0.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cmp2025_L06E_0.pdf)

## **Gender and Climate**

The gender track at COP 30 operated under the mandate of adopting a new Gender Action Plan (GAP) within the Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG), which had been renewed for ten years at COP 29. Parties arrived in Belém with a consolidated technical draft from SB 62, further developed during workshops held in Addis Ababa and Brasília, which outlined the preliminary structure of the plan and identified gaps from the previous cycle. Expectations were that COP 30 would finalize these pending issues and adopt the new plan that will guide gender and climate policies through 2034.

Negotiations began slowly due to delays in adopting the agenda, which postponed the initial formal sessions. During this period, groups — notably the G77+China — carried out internal coordination to align their positions. In the first informal consultations, Parties presented their priorities, with particular focus on terminology and on Activity D, which concerns implementation and means of implementation. This was a central issue for developing countries, which advocated for explicit references to gender-responsive financing. At the same time, there was concern about attempts to restrict the term "gender" through the use of footnotes, which could undermine the coherence of the decision. After the adoption of the agenda, sessions began to streamline the text and clarify compromise options; however, disagreements persisted between developed and developing countries, and much of the text remained bracketed, meaning no consensus had been reached. As a result, the document was forwarded to ministers during the second week. The political facilitators appointed by the Presidency — the ministers of Chile and Sweden — conducted brief consultations with

groups and Parties, identifying areas of flexibility and negotiation limits. Based on these consultations, the Presidency drafted the final version submitted to plenary, which was subsequently adopted. Civil society organizations expressed criticism of the process, noting low transparency during the final stage.

At the closing plenary, the new Belém Gender Action Plan (2026–2034) was adopted. The document maintains the five priority areas and incorporates substantive advances. Among the approved elements, a groundbreaking inclusion stands out: the preamble now recognizes the contribution of women and girls of African descent — the first such reference ever included in a UNFCCC decision text. The plan also includes, for the first time, explicit references to violence against women and girls and to care work as structural factors of climate vulnerability, providing for capacity-building, data generation, and integration of these themes into national policies. Additionally, it introduces dedicated language on the protection of women environmental human rights defenders — the first reference to this group in UNFCCC decision text.

The new GAP, more detailed and operational than its predecessor, provides clear guidance for gender-responsive climate policies for the 2026–2034 period.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2025\\_L16adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2025_L16adv.pdf)

## **Loss and Damage**

The Loss and Damage track at COP 30 consisted of two main items: (i) the Joint Annual Report (JAR) of the Executive Committee (ExCom) of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and of the Santiago Network, and (ii) the review of the WIM. Both issues had remained unresolved at COP 29 but had produced, respectively, a draft decision and an informal note at SB 62.

The 2024 JAR was adopted during the opening plenary of COP 30, in line with the draft decision produced in Bonn. It acknowledges the progress made by the WIM ExCom in

implementing the 2023–2027 workplan and the advances in structuring the Santiago Network and its interim secretariat, but it does not include new political commitments. Still during the end of the first week, the 2025 JAR was also approved. The new report mirrors the structure of the 2024 JAR, maintaining the same overall approach to reporting ExCom and Santiago Network activities, without assigning additional responsibilities.

The WIM Review, on the other hand, proved to be politically challenging. After discussions began based on the SB 62 informal note, negotiations quickly became polarized around several issues: the Gap/State of Loss and Damage Report; inclusion of the scale of financing needed; cost-effectiveness of the Santiago Network; inclusion of references to the ICJ Advisory Opinion; human-rights-based language; mention of the GST; and the inclusion of voluntary reporting on loss and damage in NDCs and BTRs.

Parties reached consensus only on the final day, after many hours of negotiation and significant effort to secure a decision. Among the key elements in the final text are: approval of the preparation of a periodic report on the gap/state of loss and damage; strengthened data and knowledge generation on climate impacts, including economic and non-economic losses; improved accessibility of technical guidance with an emphasis on ensuring direct support to the most vulnerable communities, including the definition of a minimum percentage of beneficiaries; the need for more effective institutional coordination between the WIM ExCom, the Santiago Network Board, and the Loss and Damage Response Fund; recognition and continuation of the ExCom's voluntary guidance in collaboration with BTRs; a mention of human rights in a footnote; and strong emphasis on the cost-effectiveness of the Santiago Network, requiring that as many resources as possible be directed toward its core objective of assisting developing countries. Additionally, the decision highlights recognition of the significant financing gaps that persist in the face of increasing loss and damage, a circumstance that, unfortunately, did not gain as much strength at this COP as expected.

Finally, regarding WIM governance, due to the prolonged nature of the mechanism's review and time constraints, Parties once again postponed the debate on this issue to the next COP,

agreeing to adopt the decision taken in Belém by both the CMA and the COP, without this conclusion prejudicing future negotiations on the matter.

Link: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025\\_L21\\_adv.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_L21_adv.pdf)

### **Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform**

The 14th meeting of the Facilitative Working Group (FWG) of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) took place in Belém, in preparation for COP 30, amid high expectations regarding the Amazon's central role and the need to strengthen Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' participation in the global climate regime. The meeting brought together multilingual representatives, FWG members, knowledge holders, local community leaders, youth, and experts to assess contributions, review priorities, and advance the implementation of the 2025–2027 Baku Workplan.

The meeting's dynamics combined plenary sessions, working groups organized by language and collective identity, and a collaborative reflection space. The groups discussed topics such as ethics of knowledge, safeguards, participation, representativeness, integration of traditional knowledge, and governance. Contributions emerged from multilingual small-group discussions, informal exchanges, and structured thematic debates, producing diverse and regionally balanced inputs. This collaborative process resulted in a set of comprehensive recommendations emphasizing accessibility, territoriality, and the centrality of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

The FWG 14 final decision formally adopted the agenda, expressed appreciation to the COP 30 Presidency, approved the Care Principles as guiding standards, and acknowledged the value of participants' contributions. The group decided to convene virtual and in-person meetings to advance the Baku Workplan, including a priority-setting meeting by March 2026 and discussions in 2027 on the scope and functions of the FWG. It also agreed to strengthen engagement with local communities, expand member mandates, and hold the next FWG meeting (FWG 15) from 02 to 05 June 2026. Overall, the outcomes reaffirm the commitment

to knowledge ethics, participatory governance, regional representativeness, and the institutional strengthening of the LCIPP toward COP 30.

---

## **Find out more about the Paris Agreement and COP 29**

The 2015 Paris Agreement is an almost universally adopted international treaty with 193 member countries. It is linked to the UNFCCC, an overarching international treaty system that provides broader principles, guidelines, and policies for the global community to cooperatively address the climate crisis. One of the main goals of the Agreement is to prevent the global temperature from rising above 1.5°C or to keep it well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels—a threshold that science has shown to be a "point of no return" with devastating effects on life on Earth. Additionally, the Paris Agreement aims to make countries resilient to climate change and to decarbonize financial flows.

To learn more about the Paris Agreement and understand the main negotiation topics, read our publication on the outcomes of COP 29 "[Outcomes of COP 29](#)".

**\* Bulletin made by André Castro and Maria Gabriella de Souza.**